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THE MYTH OF THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS: CONFUCIAN VALUES AND 
DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT 
Xinlin Xu 
Abstract: Literatllre 011 political ctllttlre claims COlljilcianism is incompatible with modern liberal democratic val lies. 
HOlVever, little empirical evidence has been pl�sellted to prove the validity of this statement. This paper qllalltitativefy 
stlldies the re!atiollship beflve", Cotifllcian val lies and democratic support in East Asian society and finds 110 negative 
concdatio!l benveen the iJvo. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington predicts that the post-Cold War world conflict 
would be a clash between western liberal democratic ideals and the eastern traditions of 
Confucianism and Islam. It has been taken for granted by many that Confucianistp is a hindrance to 
democratic consolidation, and its emphasis on maintaining a hierarchical society is claimed to 
promote social inequality. Li (2012) argues that the role-based society that Confucianism endorses 
discourages individualism and represses individual spontaneity. Confucianism requires that each 
person behave in accordance with his or her role in society. All these Confucian ideas are found to 
contradict modern democratic ideologies. This leads to a question: should countries that have 
Confucian traditions alter their historical roots for the sake of democratization and democratic 
consolidation? To answer this question, one must fIrst determine the compatibility of Confucianism 
and modern democratic values. Though scholars have researched this topic extensively through 
analysis of Confucian texts, the lack of empirical studies makes it diffIcult to draw defmitive 
conclusions. 
This paper examines how Confucianism directly and indirectly influences support for 
democracy at the individual level and fInds no negative correlation between the two, as Huntington 
had predicted. Confucianism is deconstructed into Elitism, Familism, Preference for Harmony, and 
Respect for Authority. Their corresponding effects on individuals' support for democracy are 
explored. This research does not merely examine the Confucian texts alone, but rather focuses on 
the Confucian principles that are practiced by the society. It tries to provide a new interpretation of 
the role Confucianism plays in the development of political culture in modern and post-modern East 
Asian society. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The prevailing assumption, articulated by Huntington in his Clash of the Civilizatiolls, is that 
Confucian thought is inherently anti-democratic. He believes that maintaining order and respecting 
hierarchy constitute the central tenets of Confucianism, and that these ideas repress the development 
of individualism. Other researchers, including Chenyang Li, question the compatibility of democracy 
and Confucianism as well. Li argues that Confucianism embraces both numerical and proportional 
RES PUB LIe A 1'63 
equality. Numerical equality indicates that all human beings are endowed with the same capacity for 
moral culrivation.l44 Moral equality does not imply that all people have the same starus; rather, it 
dictates that people with the same roles, such as fathers and husbands, are given the same kind of 
responsibilities and entitlements. Li calls such equality "role based numerical equality."145 
Proportional equality, or "equality relative to people's due," is another fundamental principle in 
Confucianism. According to this notion, some form of division of labor based on social stratification 
is necessary. Confucianism promotes the concept of xial1, which means virtuous and talented. A 
person with such qualities must be well educated and equipped with superb moral achievement, 
consequently deserving high starus in society.146 Though advocating that everyone should have equal 
opporrunities to be educated, Confucianism recognizes that only xian people could bear the 
responsibility of managing a state. Li also argues that with Confucian proportional equality comes 
political inequalities that contradict the fundamental values underlying modern democracy.14' Based 
on this analysis, political Confucianism is theoretically incompatible with modern notions of political 
equality. 
Other scholars have a more positive attitude towards the compatibility between Confucianism 
and democratic ideals. Fukuyama argues that Confucianism is relatively tolerant and has potential 
egalitarian implications, in that everyone is entitled to receive equal opporrunity to cultivate himself 
or herself into a virruous being.148 Chen also argues that Confucian values are compatible with 
modern liberal democracy. She claims the Confucian practices of "personal cultivation ... and the 
moral responsibility of the holders of power" can prevent the tendency of over-materialization of 
modern society.14' In addition, He summarizes four ideal-type models of the relationship between 
Confucianism and democracy: conflict, compatible, hybrid, and critical.150 He notes in the conflict 
model that Confucianism lacks the concept of negative liberty, which is the freedom to act free of 
exterior interferences. But he also argues that the conflict model overstates the negative role of 
Confucianism and overlooks the possibility of compatibility, consequently downplaying the 
likelihood of a Confucian contribution to democratization. However, he admits that empirically, the 
conflict model was much more accurate than the compatibility model in the early stages of 
democratization in East Asia.ls1 
144 Li 2012, 297 
145 Ibid., 299 
146 Ibid., 306 
147 Li 2012, 308 
148 Fukuyama 1995, 25 
149 Chen 2007, 211 
150 He 2010, 19 
151 Ibid., 30 
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Some scholars have conducted empirical research on Confucianism as well as on political 
culture in East Asian countries. In Democratization in Conftlcian EastAsia, Zhengxu Wang (2007) argues 
that citizens with stronger self-expression values are more likely to be critical citizens. He shows that 
economic development and social modernization in Confucian Asia results in stronger self­
expression values which in turn give rise to democratic citizenship in these societies. Wang does not 
examine how self-expression tendencies are correlated with Confucianism, but he does raise the 
important concept of self-expression values, which have played a non-negligible role in shaping civic 
culture in Confucian societies. Another empirical study done by Qi (2008) finds that Confucian 
values are negatively correlated with democratic support. However, this study did not unravel the 
mechanism through which such negative effects took place. Moreover, this study did not deconstruct 
Confucianism and investigate which doctrine or concept specifically undermined democratic support. 
At this point, no research has been done to depict the exact mechanism through which 
Confucian thought affects support for democracy at the individual level. This study aims to 
empirically test this correlation as well as the mechanism through which Confucianism can indirectly 
affect individuals' support for democracy. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research employs a large-N statistical model using data from the Asian Barometer (AB) 
Wave 2 conducted between 2004 and 2008. The analysis presented in this paper is from a set of 
structural equation models (SEM) employing Maximum Likelihood. Variables are first set up in an 
assumed causal sequence, with each variable being regressed on all variables that precede it in the 
chain. A path model enables the test of direct correlations between a particular Confucian value and 
individuals' support for democracy. It examines correlations suggested by existing political culture 
theories--such as the social capital theory--that can indirectly affect democratic support. This model 
requires the deconstruction of Confucianism into measurable variables. Confucianism covers a broad 
range of topics, such as humanity, morality, governance, and etiquetre. This study is based on the 
theoretical framework raised by Weiming Tu, which divides the ideology into two categories: political 
Confucianism and Confucian personal ethics. 
In order to measure Confucianism, one needs first to define every variable in the model. 
Elitism is one of the most prominent doctrines in Confucianism. Bell describes elitism as the "rule of 
the wise;" it exemplifies the ideal that "the best and the brightest" should exert more influence in 
order to build a good society.152 Confucius claims: "In government, the secret is Integrity. Use it, and 
you'll be like the polestar: always dwelling in its proper place the other stars tuming reverently about 
152 Bell 2006, 157 
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it."153 This statement shows that political Confucianism values the virtues of a ruler. The ruler shall 
establish himself as a moral exemplar and shall be well educated. Moreover, by likening an ideal ruler 
to a "polestar," Confucius affirms his belief in the centrality of the role rulers perform in state 
management. 
Confucianism is also governed by a fundamental principle of harmony. In the political realm, 
Confucianism means a well-rounded sociopolitical order governed by Ii, which involves "the 
behavior of persons related to each other in terms of role, status, rank, and position within a 
structured society."154 Such a strong tendency towards conformity is characterized as one form of 
Preference for Harmony. Another aspect that exemplifies this charactetistic is Confucian personal 
ethics, which advocates litigation avoidance in solving private disputes. As recorded in The Allalects: 
"I can hear a court case as well as anyone. But we need to make a world where there's no reason for 
a court case."155 Confucianism claims that if everyone in society has courtesy and treats others in a 
benevolent and altruistic manner, then harmony can be maintained and no dispute will take place. 
The Confucian personal ethic states that it is necessary to obey family elders, whose decisions 
should be followed and respected. It also stresses that one's personal behavior must honor the 
ancestors. These claims are conceptualized as Familism in this study. Confucian petsonal ethic 
encourages a harmonious and cooperative society by stipulating strict moral codes regarding respect 
that must be performed among people with different hierarchical status. Moreover, two notions of 
self are clearly differentiated in the Confucian tradition: the small self and the great self. The small 
self is the limited self. It operates as a force of inertia that resists further development. The great 
self, on the other hand, goes beyond self-centeredness. It not only relates to the family, dle society, 
the state, and beyond to the world at large, but also establishes these relationships as "part of its own 
sensitivity and concern."156 In other words, familism embodies a certain degree of self-sacrifice when 
conflicts rise between personal and family interests. 
The Confucian ideology also promotes a role-based society, where everyone has his or her 
own entidements and responsibilities, according to which each individual acquires his or her due 
equality. Confucius specifies five relationships: rulers and subjects, fathers and sons, husbands and 
wives, elder and younger brothers, and finally friends and friends. He maintains that if individuals 
observe these relationships properly, the society will stabilize itself. This observation of social 
hierarchy is conceptualized as Respect for Authority. 
When studying the correlation between political culture and democracy, it is worth examining 
the social capital theory, which integrates sociology and economics to study civic tradition as well as 
153 Confucius 1998, 11 
154 Schwartz 1985, 67 
155 Confucius and Hinton 1998, 132 
156Tu 
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political dynamics. In other words, besides direct correlations, Confucian values may affect 
democratic support at the inclividual level through other mechanisms suggested by literature on 
political culture. Social capital theorists have shown that social trust and democratic consolidation are 
positively correlated.157 Inglehart argues that social trust is essential for people to view political 
opponents as a loyal opposition and is strongly correlated with stable democracy.l58 Coleman (1988) 
contends that a system of mutual trust is an important form of social capital through which future 
obligations and expectations may be based. Regarding social trust, Putman draws a clistinction 
between "thick trust," which is "embedded in personal relations," and "thin trust," which extends to 
other people within the community. Though this clichotomy has been criticized for failing to 
characterize the complexity of social trust in the real world, it is especially appropriate for stuclies 
East Asian countries. Qi argues that Confucian personal ethics encourage people to "pursue interests 
and seek social exchanges" within "in-groups"l59 where the "thick trust" applies. She also finds that, 
in countries influenced by Confucianism, such particular trust is negatively correlated with general 
interpersonal trust in society.IGO Therefore, this study will also incorporate General Trust as an 
intervening variable to test whether Confucian values indirectly influence democratic support by 
altering social capital. 
Another concept raised by Inglehart is the postmaterialist value, which emboclies tolerance, 
quality of life, self-expression, intellectual and aesthetic needs, etc.IGI He finds that postmaterialist 
values contribute to people's declining confidence in hierarchical institutions, which in turn 
strengthen their support for democracy.lG2 This theory has been confirmed in Wang's study on 
democratization in Confucian East Asian countries. Based on this study, I incorporated Self­
Expression values as another intervening variable. By influencing this variable, Confucian values 
could possibly have an indirect impact on individuals' support for democracy. In measuring self­
expression values, I extracted the elements comparatively relevant to democratic support. 
Individuals' interest in and willingness to participate in politics is used as an indicator of the level of 
self-expression values; individuals' potential for civil disobedience is another. John Rawls defines civil 
clisobeclience as "politically-motivated, public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law 
undertaken with the aim of bringing about a change in laws or government policies."IG3 Civil 
clisobeclience is a call to conscience when no other means of self-expression is found adequate or 
157 Inglehart 1997; Putnam 1993 and 2000; Fukuyama 1995; Newton 2001 
158 Inglehart 1997, 172-173 
159 Qi 2008, 9 
lGOIbid., 17-19 
161 Inglehart 1997,109-130 
162 Ibid., 299 
163 Rawls, 1971 
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satisfactory. Therefore, the level of one's potential for civil disobedience reflects one's aspiration for 
liberty and inclination to act in self-defense through public expression. 
Democracy is a concept that resists attempts to objectively define. Schmitter and Karl 
recapitulate nine "procedural minimum" conditions for democracy,l64 while Whitehead argues that all 
definitions of democracy are contextually based.165 However, regardless of the definitions of 
democracy, there is a consensus on the liberal political ideal that laid the foundation of democracy. 
The ideal of liberty claims that all men are born equal, and as a result, they all have natural rights to 
life, to property, and to civil freedoms of association. All individuals are equally entitled to exercise 
the rights listed above, irrespective of their sex, race, religion, or political views. As implied by liberal 
democratic ideals, political equality is a prereqnisite for modern democracy. Though unequal 
distribution of political resources poses the question of whether political equality can be realized or 
not, the goal of political equality still has its intrinsic merits.166 On the surface, the Confucian idea of 
proportional equality, which implies that virtuous people should run the government, conflicts with 
the modern ideal of political equality. Proportional equality resembles Dahl's concept of 
guardianship, which states that only qualified elites can govern for the common good.167 Dahl argues 
that guardians who make moral judgments based on the "science of ruling" and the knowledge of the 
general good misunderstand the relationship between private and collective interests. Individuals who 
give consent to guardianship based on economic performance are regarded as having lower levels of 
democratic support. 
I synthesized the literature on Confucianism and incorporated social capital and post­
materialist theory to hypothesize a path model that depicts the mechanism by which Confucianism 
generates impact on democratic support at the individual level. The final model of the correlation 
between Confucian values and support for democracy in East Asia will be obtained by dropping all 
the paths that show insignificant correlations. The selection of countries covers China, South Korea, 
Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The reason I chose these cases is because my study is confmed to 
East Asian countries. All these countries or regions either have had Confucianism as their offlcial 
religion, such as South Korea and Japan, or are occupied by population that is culturally rooted in 
Confucianism, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan.168 
The hypotheses I proposed are outlined in Table 1 below. Elitism, Respect for Authority, 
Familism, and Preference for Harmony are exogenous variables, and the covariances between the 
variables are represented by two-ended arrows. Causal relations between variables are represented by 
164 Schmitter and Karl, 1991, 81-82 
165 Whitehead 2002, 26 
166 Dahl 2006, 36 and 84 
167 Ibid., 53 
168 Lew, Wang and Choi, 2001; Nosco, 1997 
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unidirectional arrows. The unexplained effects are represented by error 1, 2 and 3. In this model, 
direct correlations between every single Confucian value and support for democracy are assumed. 
Further, direct correlations between Confucian values and General Trust as well as Self-Expression 
Values are also represented. The total effect that Confucianism has on democratic support is thus 
calculated by adding up the direct and indirect effects. 
Figure 1: Hypotheses 
Elitism 
Repseet for Authority 
Familism 
Harmony 
MEASUREMENT AND OPERATIONALIZATIO 
Table 1: Measurement of Variables 
Variable 
Elitism 
Respect for 
Authoriry 
Familism 
Measurement 
• "We should get rid of parliament and 
elections and have a strong leader decide 
things." 
• "People with little or no education should 
have as much say in politics as highly­
educated people." 
• "Being a student, one should not question 
the authority of their teacher." 
• "Government leaders are like the head of a 
family; we should all follow their 
decisions." 
• "For the sake of the family, the individual 
should put his personal interests second." 
• "Even if parents' demands are 
unreasonable, children still should do what 
they ask." 
Description 
For both statements, respondents 
choosing "strongly 
disagree/ disapprove" were coded 
as 1) "disagree/disapprove" as 2, 
"agree/ approve" as 3, and 
"strongly agree/approve" as 4. The 
sum score stands for the level of 
elitism. The higher the score, the 
higher the level of elitism. 
Same as above. The higher the 
score, the higher the level of 
respect for authority. 
Same as above. 
Preference 
for 
Harmony 
Out-group 
trust 
Self­
Expression 
Values 
Support for 
democracy 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
"When one has a conflict with a neighbor, 
the best way to deal with it is to 
accommodate the other person." 
"If people have too many different ways of 
thinking, society will be chaotic." 
"Generally speaking, would you say most 
people can be trusted or that you must be 
very careful in dealing with people?" 
"How much trust do you have in other 
people you interact with?" 
"How interested would you say you are in 
politics?" 
"If possible, I don't want to get involved in 
political matters." 
"Citizens should always obey laws and 
regulations, even if they disagree with 
them." 
"If you had to choose between democracy 
and economic development, which would 
you say is more important?" 
''Which of the following statements comes 
closest to your own opinion?" 
Source: Asian Barometer Wave 2 
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Same as above. 
For the first question, "you must be 
very careful in dealing with people" 
was coded as 1, "most people can 
be trusted" as 2. For the second 
question, "none at all" was coded 
as 1, "not very much trust" as 2, 
"quite a lot trust" as 3, and "'a great 
deal of trust" as 4. The sum score 
of these two questions indicates the 
level of out-group trust. 
For the first question, "not at all 
interested" was coded as 1, "not 
very interested" as 2, "somewhat 
interested" as 3, and "very 
interested" as 4. For the second and 
third statements, "strongly agree" 
was coded as 1, "somewhat agree" 
as 2, "somewhat disagree" as 3, and 
"strongly disagree" as 4. The sum 
of these three scores stands for the 
level of self-expression values. 
For the flrst question, "economic 
development is definitely more 
important" was coded as 1) 
"somewhat more important" as 2, 
"equally important" as 3, 
"democracy is somewhat more 
important" as 4, and "democracy is 
definitely more important" as 5. 
For the second question, "it does 
not matter whether we have a 
democracy or not" was coded as 1, 
"under some circumstances, an 
authoritarian government can be 
preferable" as 2, and "democracy is 
always preferable" as 3. The sum 
score of these two questions 
indicates level of support for 
democracy. 
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A reduced model, which shows the correlations between variables, was produced by 
dropping all the insignificant paths in the original one. The path coefficients are shown above each 
arrow. The RMSEA is .017, which is smaller than the .05 required for a good model. Therefore, the 
goodness of fit measure supports the adequacy of this model. The Chi-squire is not used here to test 
the adequacy of this model. First, the finding of significance in the likelihood ratio test of a path 
model can occur even with very small differences of the model-implied and observed covariance 
metrics, especially given the large-N of the samples in this study, which is 9,813. Moreover, since 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) tends to inflate Chi-square, RMSEA, an indicator less 
influenced by sample size is used to measure the goodness of fit of this model. 
Figure 2: Reduced Model 
Elitism 
Repseet for Authority 
Familism 
Harmony 
Note: Comparative fit index = 0.986; root mean square error of approximation (Rl\1SEA) = 0.017; 99 percent 
confidence interval for RMSEA = 0.011-0.024; N =9813, Chi-square=28, p<O.OOOl. 
Table 2: Total Effects of Confucian Values on Democratic Attitudes 
Elitism Authority Familism Self-Expression Harmony Trust 
Self-Expression .079 .056 .095 .000 .000 .000 
Trust .000 .000 -.029 .000 .000 .000 
Democracy .065 .009 .014 .162 .020 .061 
In the model, no direct correlation is found between Respect for Authority, Familism and 
Support for Democracy. Familism is found to be negatively correlated with General Trust, which 
confirms Qi's finding that interpersonal trust in East Asian countries tends to undermine general 
social trust. This model also confirms the social capital theory, which states that social trust promotes 
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democratic governance. The model does not fInd any direct negative correlation between the four 
sets of Confucian values and Self-Expression Values. On the contrary, Elitism, Familism and Respect 
for Authority are found to contribute to Self-Expression Values. In this model, Preference for 
Harmony neither contributes to nor undermines General Trust or Self-Expression Values, but 
exhibits a positive correlation with Support for Democracy. The total effects are calculated by adding 
the direct effects, association of one variable with another free from other intervening paths, and 
indirect effects, association of one variable with another mediated through other variables in the 
model. As shown in Table 2, the net effects the four values have on democratic support are all 
positive according to this model, with Self-Expression Values affecting Support for Democracy most 
signifIcantly. 
Familism undermines Support for Democracy by reducing out-group trust, but the net effect 
of Familism on Support for Democracy is nonetheless positive. Furthermore, none of the four sets 
of Confucian values are found, directly or indirectly, to undermine democratic support at the 
individual level. 
CONCLUSIONS 
No negative correlation between Confucian values and democratic support is found in this 
study. On the contrary, a positive correlation, negligible as it is, is presented in the model. Therefore, 
this study does not support the claim made in the Clash of Civilizations stating that a major conflict 
exists between Confucian values and democracy. With the small path coeffIcients, this study neither 
supports the claim that Confucian values could positively contribute to individuals' democratic 
support. However, this study refutes cultural arguments against Confucianism regarding 
democratization or democratic consolidation. 
The constitutional liberties in modern democratic countries, such as freedom of speech and 
religion, belong to negative liberty, which designates rights that can be exercised free from 
interference. However, the correlativity of rights and duties dictates that rights and duties are just two 
sides of a same concept. Confucianism rarely stipulates positive duties people have towards one 
another; rather, it mostly enumerates negative duties, which are actions people shall refrain from 
doing for the benefIt of others. To say A has a duty not to act in a certain way towards B is the same 
as saying that B has a right over A's not acting in that way. The Analects says, "Never impose on 
others what you would not choose for yourself."l6' If each individual in the society attaches 
signifIcant importance to self-autonomy, then everyone else has a duty not to interfere with this 
preference as long as it does not do harm to others. Culture is not stagnant, but rather constantly 
169 Confucius 1998, 176 
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evolving and opening to new interpretation. Confucianism, it appears, is flexible enough to 
accommodate new perspectives. 
One cannot simply conclude a particular culture is pro-authoritarian or will foster the gtowth 
of democratic ideas. Empirically, no evidence is found that Confucianism is incompatible with 
democratic support. Future research should focus on whether institutions established based on 
Confucian values or practices inherited from Confucian traditions have played a role in hindering 
democratization or democratic consolidation. 
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APPENDICES 
Regression Weights 
Estimate S.E. CR. P 
Trust <--- Familism -.011 .004 -2.584 .010 
Self-Expression <--- Familism .093 .012 7.481 *** 
Self-Expression <--- Authority .073 .017 4.287 *** 
Self-Expression <--- Elitism .229 .038 6.018 *** 
Democracy <--- Trust .113 .023 4.950 *** 
Democracy <--- Self-Expression .117 .010 12.223 *** 
Democracy <--- Harmony .022 .013 1.669 .095 
Democracy <--- Elitism .109 .025 4.323 *** 
***p<O.OOOl 
S d eli d R  tan ar ze egresslOn OJg! ts 
Estimate 
Trust <--- Familism -.029 
Self-Expression <--- Familism .095 
Self-Expression <--- Authority .056 
Self-Expression <--- Elitism .079 
Democracy <--- Trust .061 
Democracy <--- Self-Expression .162 
Democracy <--- Harmony .020 
Democracy <--- Elitism .052 
Covariances 
Estimate S.E. CR. P 
Authority <--> Elitism .179 .017 10.671 *** 
Familism <--> Authoril) 1.319 .048 27.563 *** 
Familism <--> Elitism .210 .021 10.166 *** 
Harmony <--> Authoril) .746 .031 24.172 *** 
Harmony <--> Familism .984 .038 26.016 *** 
Harmony <--> Elitism .126 .013 9.497 *** 
S ::,quare d Mul' I C tiple I . orre atlons 
Estimate 
Self-Expression .025 
Trust .001 
Democracy .035 
